Remind the mining industry of the risks that some of its planned actions may bring

Preface: Recently, two articles have attracted attention in the cryptocurrency circle. One is the "Proposal of the "Terminator Plan" for the Expansion Dispute" proposed by Shui Wuhun in the forum, and the other is the "Calling on Ant Pool to Commit to Abolish Forks Below 25% and Maintain Bitcoin Unification" proposed by Jiang Zhuoer. It can be said that both are proposals for mining actions, both are very good articles, and are generally recognized in the macro sense. However, based on my understanding of technology, I would like to kindly remind you of the risks that may arise if you do so. Note that the premise assumes that the actions of miners do not correspond to the full consensus of the entire cryptocurrency circle. If you are sure that it is synchronized with the consensus of the cryptocurrency circle, then there is no problem.

1. The rationality of the 90% consensus

In the real world, some major events, such as amending the constitution, only require 3/4 or less people to agree, and some referendums like Brexit only require 50%. However, the previous version of the constitution and the revised version will not be too different, and it is impossible for the amendment of the constitution to cause the country to split. As for the Brexit referendum, the country will not be split due to the referendum result. If it is split, it will show that the 50% is unreasonable.

However, the virtual world is different from the real world. In the virtual world of cryptocurrency, the lifeblood of a coin lies in the consensus of the coin circle. When two irreconcilable consensuses emerge, there is a risk of splitting into two coins. All efforts to avoid splitting may be wasted due to the split of a low-consensus hard fork. Therefore, we call for a higher consensus of more than 90% before hard forking. As for why 90% is chosen, please see the data below, where the estimated market value of the coin is the fan loyalty multiplied by the application:

50% consensus: fan loyalty ratio is 1:1, the application will not abandon half of the people, 1:1, the coin market value estimation ratio is 1:1

60% consensus: fan loyalty ratio is 3:2, the application will not abandon 2/5 of the people, 1:1, and the estimated market value of the currency is 3:2

75% consensus: fan loyalty ratio is 3:1, the application will not abandon 1/4 of the people, 1:1, and the estimated market value of the currency is 3:1

80% consensus: fan loyalty ratio is 4:1, it is estimated that half of the applications will abandon 1/5 of the people, 2:1, and the estimated market value of the currency is 8:1

90% consensus: fan loyalty ratio is 9:1, it is estimated that 80% of applications will abandon 1/10 of the people, 5:1, and the estimated market value of the currency is 45:1

From the above estimates, we can see that 50% consensus is likely to form two currencies with equal market value, which is intuitive. It is obvious that a currency application will not abandon up to 1/4 of its users, so when the consensus is low, the currency application should choose to be compatible with both currencies. Specifically, if the consensus is not enough, major trading platforms are likely to launch two currencies at the same time, and it is impossible to abandon more than 1/4 of the users. Some third-party currency platforms are likely to support both currencies, and some merchants that support currency payment are the same. However, when the consensus is 80%, that is, only 1/5, it is estimated that some currency applications will begin to give up supporting both at the same time. Assuming that half of them give up, the application ratio is 2:1, then multiplying the fan loyalty ratio of 4:1, it is estimated that the currency market value ratio can reach 8:1. Although it is not a big threat to the currency with a consensus advantage, the two are still at the same order of magnitude, and there is still a great risk. With a 90% consensus, on the one hand, the fan loyalty ratio is as high as 9:1, and on the other hand, with only 1/10 of the users, many coin applications will give up supporting coins with a minority consensus, for example, 5:1. Then, the multiplied coin market value ratio is as high as 45:1, and the coins with less consensus can be classified as competing coins without worrying about the risk of splitting the coin circle. Of course, the higher the ratio, the better. A consensus of about 90% is enough to ensure no risk, and considering feasibility, there is no need to increase it. A hard fork with a 75% consensus is easy to achieve, but the risk of splitting the coin circle will be greater, so it should not be supported.

2. 90% Cryptocurrency Consensus and 90% Hashrate Voting

Many people, especially those in the mining industry, are too "superstitious" about the status of computing power in the cryptocurrency circle, and take the results of computing power voting for granted as the consensus of the cryptocurrency circle itself. For example, some people say that the restrictions of the Hong Kong consensus should be relaxed to allow mining pools and miners to vote freely. In fact, this restriction itself is a restriction given by part of the cryptocurrency consensus. Look at the signatories of the Hong Kong Public Consensus. There are mining pools and developers, but also several major trading platforms and several cryptocurrency application companies. It is not simply an agreement between miners and Core as many people understand.

The results of the computing power voting are merely a statistical tool for displaying the consensus of the cryptocurrency community, and the results of the computing power voting should not be directly regarded as the consensus of the entire cryptocurrency community.

The consensus of the entire cryptocurrency community should include but not be limited to: free discussions among fans in the community, industry consensus conferences similar to the Hong Kong Roundtable, statements from major cryptocurrency companies, especially trading platforms and mining pools, opinions from different cryptocurrency development teams and key developers, opinions from merchants and speculators who use the cryptocurrency, etc. The hashrate vote of miners should only represent and reflect the consensus of the cryptocurrency community.

In most cases, the result of the miners' hashrate voting is consistent with the consensus of the entire cryptocurrency community. Although the possibility of inconsistency cannot be ruled out, it is fine as long as the deviation is not too large. For example, the hashrate voting of Classic accounts for only about 5%, which is consistent with the consensus support formed by the entire cryptocurrency community's 75% risk awareness. Of course, Classic supporters will complain that it is the limitation of the Hong Kong Roundtable Consensus, and the Hong Kong Roundtable Consensus itself is part of the cryptocurrency community consensus, representing the views of cryptocurrency trading platforms, cryptocurrency mining pools and some cryptocurrency applications. Wasn't there also a Nakamoto Roundtable Consensus supporting Classic later? However, it did not form a signature consensus result, and its influence was far less important than the Hong Kong Roundtable Consensus. Regarding the community, the main community of Classic is /r/btc, while the main community of Core is /r /bitcoin. The latter's subscription volume is now 182,059, which is nearly ten times higher than the former's 18,744, and is also close to the hashrate voting ratio.

3. Cryptocurrency Circles Influencing Miners’ Voting and Directly Planning Miners’ Voting

Most miners are probably loyal fans of the coin, so it is normal for fans of the coin community to discuss freely, and for supporters and opponents to analyze the pros and cons of miners and influence their decisions. It is also necessary for miners' hash rate voting to more truly represent the consensus of the coin circle.

Another influence is the signature consensus call formed by some important meetings in the industry, such as the Hong Kong Roundtable. They represent the voice of the application of the company's currency in the currency circle, and should also be considered and influenced when miners vote on computing power. The specific influence is also reflected in the default options given to miners by the mining pool when mining. Note that it is only the default option, not a complete replacement of the miners' voting rights. For example, Fishpool now also provides a mining pool option that supports Classic. That is, if it supports it, you can modify the mining parameters and switch to it. For miners, switching mining pools is a very simple matter at the technical level. You only need to modify the configuration.

The two articles cited at the beginning of the article are some direct plans for voting. To put it simply, the "Terminator Plan" is that the "Terminator", a large computing power owner, controls a part of the computing power, and does not support Classic at first. After Classic reaches 75%, the "Terminator" suddenly turns to support it, so that it is expected to increase from 75% to more than 90%, so as to achieve a safer hard fork. The plan of "promising to invalidate forks below 25%" may be more radical. To put it simply, it is a "maintainer", a large computing power owner, to launch a 51 attack to isolate the blocks of non-supporters. In other words, this large computing power owner ignores and does not recognize the blocks packaged by 25% of the computing power, resulting in these 25% having only two choices: one is to keep mining isolated blocks without income, and the other is to join the party with more computing power. That is to let them give up their original choice and form a unified computing power vote.

Both of these solutions involve some people directly interfering with the voting of computing power. The "Terminator" hides his true intentions for a period of time and delivers a fatal blow. The "Maintainer" directly relies on "force" to isolate and force some computing power to change their voting options.

4. Potential risks of computing power voting that cannot express the consensus of the cryptocurrency circle

The following is a discussion of the potential risks that may arise if the computing power voting results cannot truly express the consensus of the entire cryptocurrency community due to interference from certain forces or plans.

In the "Terminator" plan, the entire termination plan and who is the terminator are made public. Although the interference may be better, the "maintainer" is forcibly depriving up to 1/4 of the computing power to express the consensus of the currency circle behind it. If it can be expressed more realistically, it will be fine. But what if the 1/4 of the people in the currency circle insist on not giving up? Please note that I am only suggesting this possibility here, this risk, not saying that it will definitely happen.

Under the instantaneous jump of the "Terminator" and the oppressive unity of the "Maintainer", there may be a consensus in some cryptocurrency circles that is not well reflected in the computing power. In this case, it is ok for them to swallow their anger, but if they insist on their own views and cannot swallow this breath, the consequence will be division.

The 90% computing power support of the "Terminator" does not necessarily represent 90% consensus, and under the "Maintainer", it may actually represent only 75% of the consensus in the currency circle. The premise for their plan to maintain the unity of the currency circle is that the split fork Bitcoin still uses POW computing power, and must still use the POW coin of the SHA256 algorithm. But please be reminded that it is not certain in the hard fork environment. Since it has been hard forked, the weaker party in computing power may completely modify the POW computing power algorithm, or even temporarily switch from POW to POS. In theory, it is possible, not to say that it is completely impossible or simply that non-SHA256 is a copycat, especially when it may be as high as 1/4 of the currency circle consensus. Think about it, the Classic computing power was only about 10% at its highest, and it caused such a big storm. A coin that can reach 25% of the currency circle consensus, its vitality should not be underestimated.

V. Summary and Suggestions

Of course, I am not refuting the "Terminator" plan and the "Maintainer" plan for maintaining the unity of the currency circle and the contribution of a smooth hard fork. These two are indeed good suggestions and have positive significance. However, they only promote the consensus of computing power on the surface, not the consensus of the currency circle behind it. If those who are forcibly represented have no opinion and swallow their anger, there is no problem. But here we just want to give some reminders to the mining industry. If you act without authorization, in case of a major violation of the consensus of the currency circle, there may be risks. That is, the forced unification of the form of computing power may not necessarily bring about the unification of the consensus of the currency circle. In case the consensus of that party accounts for a high proportion, and they launch a POW version or POS version of Bitcoin with a modified algorithm, it will cause the currency circle to split. The current domestic reality where computing power is mainly concentrated may cause Europe and the United States, which have a large number of currency applications, to not support the branch that our mining industry strongly promotes. If it fails, the entire mining industry will be at risk of decline or even disappearance, so be careful.

It is recommended to let it happen naturally and not to interfere. If 75% consensus is too low, then directly increase it to 90%, and don't add "Terminators" to cause a huge short-term change in the proportion of representative miners and support. As for opponents, gradually suppress them to 10% through the popularization of cryptocurrency knowledge, rather than forcibly suppressing them to 0% by violence. It may be possible to suppress them, but the more they are suppressed, the more resistance they may have. It is not good to fight violence with violence, and people should be convinced by reason. If you are confident that your proposition is really powerful in the cryptocurrency circle and can gain 90% consensus in the cryptocurrency circle, then why do you need to make unnecessary controls. If you are not confident that you can gain 90% consensus in the cryptocurrency circle, then you should consider the ideas of those who exceed 10%. After all, everyone is for the long-term good of the cryptocurrency circle. Lightning Network and side chain technology can theoretically have a better effect on improving transaction processing capabilities than direct hard expansion.

Finally, I strongly support the "Hong Kong Roundtable Consensus on Expansion" and the 90% 2MB consensus. Since the members of Core have signed and agreed, they should abide by the agreement to release the hard fork code in July, and set it to activate the hard fork expansion in July 2017 with sufficient consensus in the currency circle. This "Hong Kong Roundtable Consensus" is the best way to solve the current expansion problem. I call on Core not to breach the contract, and also call on the domestic mining industry not to impulsively do too radical things such as forcing a hard fork in case of breach, so that it has an excuse to push the POS version. It is recommended that it is best to refuse to update any future updates on the grounds of security, which can be a very serious punishment for Core. The Lightning Network can be supported because it can emergency-enhance the currency transaction processing capacity to exceed the Visa level.